the playful spirit of the theory. We felt no need for duplicating many motivating examples from these sources, and we have no claims for originality on any of the results.
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2. The GROUP of Games 2.1. What is a game? [ONAG, § § 7, 0] , [WW, § § 1, 2] Our notion of a game tries to formalize the abstract structure underlying games such as Chess or Go: these are two-person games with complete information; there is no chance or shuffling. The two players are usually called Left (L) and Right (R). Every game has some number of positions, each of which is described by the set of allowed moves for each player. Each move (of Left or Right) leads to a new position, which is called a (left or right) option of the previous position. Each of these options can be thought of as another game in its own right: it is described by the sets of allowed moves for both players.
From a mathematical point of view, all that matters are the sets of left and right options that can be reached from any given position -we can imagine the game represented by a rooted tree with vertices representing positions and with oriented edges labeled L or R according to the player whose moves they reflect. The root represents the initial position, and the edges from any position lead to another rooted (sub-)tree, the root of which represents the position just reached.
Identifying a game with its initial position, it is completely described by the sets of left and right options, each of which is another game. This leads to the recursive Definition 2.1 (1). Note that the sets L and R of options may well be infinite or empty. The Descending Game Condition (2) simply says that every game must eventually come to an end no matter how it is played; the number of moves until the end can usually not be bounded uniformly in terms of the game only.
Definition 2.1 (Game).
(1) Let L and R be two sets of games. Then the ordered pair G := (L, R) is a game.
(2) (Descending Game Condition (DGC)). There is no infinite sequence of games
Logically speaking, this recursive definition does not tell you what games are, and it does not need to: it only needs to specify the axiomatic properties of games. A major purpose of this paper is of course to explain the meaning of the theory; see for example the creation of games below.
Definition 2.2 (Options and Positions).
(1) (Options). The elements of L and R are called left resp. right options of G.
(2) (Positions). The positions of G are G and all the positions of any option of G.
In the recursive definition of games, a game consists of two sets of games. Before any game is 'created', the only set of games we have is the empty set: the simplest game is the 'zero game' 0 = ({ }, { }) with L = R = { }: in this game, no player has a move. Now that we have a non-empty set of games, the next simpler games are 1 = ({0}, { }) (whose name indicates that it represents one free move for Left), −1 = ({ }, {0}) (a free move for Right) and * = ({0}, {0}) (a free move for whoever gets to take it first).
Notation. We simplify (or abuse?) notation as follows: let L = {G L 1 , G L 2 , . . . } and R = {G R 1 , G R 2 , . . . } be two arbitrary sets of games (we do not mean to indicate that L or R are countable or non-empty); then for
. . . Hence a game is really a set with two distinguished kinds of elements: the left respectively right options 1 . With this notation, the four simplest games introduced so far can be written more easily as 0 = { | } 1 = {0 | } − 1 = { | 0} * = {0 | 0} .
Eventually, we will want the two players to move alternately: that will be formalized in § 2.2; but the Descending Game Condition will be needed to hold even when players do not move alternately, see § 2.3.
The simple recursive (and at first mind-boggling) definition of games has its counterpart in the following equally simple induction principle that is used in almost every proof in the theory.
Theorem 2.3 (Conway Induction). Let P be a property which games might have, such that any game G has property P whenever all left and right options of G have this property. Then every game has property P .
More generally, for n ≥ 1, let P (G 1 , . . . , G n ) be a property which any n-tuple of games might have (i.e., an n-place relation). Suppose that P (G 1 , . . . , G i , . . . , G n ) holds whenever all P (G 1 , . . . , G ′ i , . . . , G n ) hold (for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and all left and right options G ′ i ∈ L i ∪ R i , where G i = (L i , R i )). Then P (G 1 , . . . , G n ) holds for every n-tuple of games.
Proof: Suppose there is a game G which does not satisfy P . If all left and right options of G satisfy P , then G does also by hypothesis, so there is an option G ′ of G which does not satisfy P . Continuing this argument inductively, we obtain a sequence G, G ′ , G ′′ , . . . of games, each an option of its predecessor, which violates the Descending Game Condition. Note that formalizing this argument needs the Axiom of Choice.
The general statement follows similarly: if P (G 1 , . . . , G i , . . . , G n ) is false, it follows that some P (G 1 , . . . , G ′ i , . . . , G n ) (for some i and some G ′ i ∈ L i ∪ R i ) is also false, so either some P (G 1 , . . . , G ′′ i , . . . , G n ) or some P (G 1 , . . . , G ′ i , . . . , G ′ j , . . . , G n ) is false, and it is easy to extract an infinite sequence of games G i , G 1 It is customary to abuse notation and write {L | R} for the ordered pair (L, R). We will try to avoid that in this paper.
Note that Conway Induction does not need an explicit induction base (as opposed to ordinary induction for natural numbers which must be based at 0): the empty game 0 = { | } satisfies property P automatically because all its options do-there is no option which might fail property P .
As a typical illustration of how Conway Induction works, we show that its first form implies the Descending Game Condition.
Proposition 2.4. Conway Induction implies the Descending Game Condition.
Proof: Consider the property P (G): there is no infinite chain of games G, G ′ , G ′′ , . . . starting with G so that every game is followed by one of its options. This property clearly is of the kind described by Conway Induction, so it holds for every game. P Conway's definition of a game [ONAG, § § 0, 7] consists of part (1) in Definition 2.1, together with the statement 'all games are constructed in this way'. One way of making this precise is by Conway Induction: a game is 'constructed in this way' if all its options are, so Conway's axiom becomes a property which all games enjoy. We have chosen to use the equivalent Descending Game Condition in the definition in order to treat induction for one or several games on an equal footing.
Another easy consequence of the Conway Induction principle is that the positions of a game form a set (and not a proper CLASS).
2.2. Winning a game. [ONAG, § § 7, 0] , [WW, § 2] From now on, suppose that the two players must move alternately. When we play a game, the most important aspect usually is whether we can win it or will lose it. In fact, most of the theory is about deciding which player can force a win in certain kinds of games. So we need some formal definition of who wins and who loses; there are no ties or draws in this theory 2 . The basic decision we make here is that we consider a player to have lost a game when it is his turn to move but he is unable to do so (because his set of options is empty): the idea is that we cannot win if we do not have a good move, let alone no move at all. This Normal Play Convention, as we will see, leads to a very rich and appealing theory.
There is also a Misère Play Convention that the loser is the one who makes the last move; with that convention, most of our theory would fail, and there is no comparably rich theory known: our fundamental equality G = G for every game G very much rests on the normal play convention (Theorem 2.10); see also the end of Section 7 for the special case of impartial games. Another possible winning convention is by score; while scores are not built into our theory, they can often be simulated: see the remark after Definition 5.4 and [WW, Part 3] .
Every game G will be of one of the following four outcome classes: (1) Left can enforce a win, no matter who starts; (2) Right can enforce a win, no matter who starts; (3) the first player can enforce a win, no matter who it is; (4) the second player can enforce a win, no matter who. We will abbreviate these four possibilities by G > 0, G < 0, G 0, and G = 0, respectively: here, G 0 is usually read 'G is fuzzy to zero'; the justification for the notation G = 0 will become clear in § 2.3. We can contract these as usual: G ≥ 0 means G > 0 or G = 0, i.e. Left can enforce a win (at least) if he is the second player; G ≤ 0 means that Right can win as second player; similarly, G £ 0 means G > 0 or G 0, i.e. Left can win as first player ('G is greater than or fuzzy to zero'), and G ¡ 0 means that Right can win as first player.
It turns out that only G ≥ 0 and G ≤ 0 are fundamental: if G ≥ 0, then Left wins as second player, so Right has no good opening move. A good opening move for Right would be an option G R in which Right could win; since Left must start in G R , this would mean G R ≤ 0. This leads to the following formal definition:
Definition 2.5 (Order of Games). We define:
The interpretation of winning needs to be based at games where Left or Right win immediately: this is the Normal Play Convention that a player loses when it is her turn but she has no move available. Formally, if Left has no move at all in G, then clearly G ≤ 0 by definition, so Right wins when Left must start but cannot move. Note that the convention 'both players move alternately' enters the formal theory in Definition 2.5.
As so often, Definition 2.5 is recursive: in order to decide whether or not G ≥ 0, we must know whether G R ≤ 0 etc. The Descending Game Condition makes this well-defined: if there was a game G for which G ≥ 0 or G ≤ 0 was not well-defined, then this could only be so because there was an option G L or G R for which these relations were not well-defined etc., and this would eventually violate the DGC.
It is convenient to introduce the following conventions.
Definition 2.6 (Order of Games). We define:
A game G such that G = 0 is often called a 'zero game' (not to be confused with the zero game 0 = { | }!).
All these cases can be interpreted in terms of winning games; for example, G £ 0 means that Left can win when moving first: indeed, the condition assures the existence of a good opening move for Left to G L ≥ 0 in which Left plays second. Note that these definitions immediately imply the claim made above that for every game G exactly one of the following statements is true: G = 0, G > 0, G < 0 or G 0. They are the four cases depending on the two independent possibilities ∃G L ≥ 0 and ∃G R ≤ 0, see also Figure 1 . When we say 'Left wins' etc., we mean that Left can enforce a win by optimal play; this does not mean that we assume a winning strategy to be actually known, or that Right might not win if Left plays badly. For example, for the beautiful game of Hex [Hex1, Hex2] , there is a simple proof that the first player can enforce a win, though no winning strategy is known unless the board size is very small -and there are serious Hex tournaments.
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The existence of a strategy for exactly one player (supposing that it is fixed who starts) is built into the definitions: to fix ideas, suppose that Right starts in a game G ≥ 0. Then there is no right option G R ≤ 0, so either G has no right option at all (and Left wins effortlessly), or all G R £ 0, so every G R has a left option G RL ≥ 0: whatever Right's move, Left has an answer leading to another game G RL ≥ 0, so Left will never be the one who runs out of moves when it is his turn. By the Descending Game Condition, the game eventually stops at a position where there are no options left for the player whose turn it is, and this must be Right. Therefore, Left wins. Note that this argument does not assume that a strategy for Left is known, nor does it provide an explicit strategy.
We will define equality of games below as an equivalence relation. What we have so far is equality of games in the set-theoretic sense; to distinguish notation, we use a different word for this and say that two games G and H are identical and write G ≡ H if they have the same sets of (identical) left resp. right options.
For the four simplest games, we have the following outcome classes. We have obviously 0 = 0, since no player has a move; then it is easy to see that 1 > 0, −1 < 0 and * 0.
A note on set theory. Definition 2.1 might look simple and innocent, but the CLASS of games thus defined is a proper CLASS (as opposed to a set): one way to see this is to observe that every ordinal number is a game ( § 4.1). We have adopted the convention (introduced in [ONAG] ) of writing GROUP, FIELD etc. for algebraic structures that are proper classes (as opposed to sets).
The set-theoretic foundations of our theory are the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms, including the axiom of choice (ZFC), and expanded by proper classes. It is a little cumbersome to express our theory in terms of ZFC: a game is a set with two kinds of elements, and it might be more convenient to treat combinatorial game theory as an appropriately modified analog to ZFC. See the discussion in [ONAG, Appendix to Part 0], where Conway argues that "the complicated nature of these constructions [expressing our theory in terms of ZFC] tells us more about the nature of formalizations within ZF than about our system of numbers . . . [formalization within ZFC] destroys a lot of its symmetry". In this note, we will not go into details concerning such issues; we only note that our Descending Game Condition in Definition 2.1 corresponds to the Axiom of Foundation in ZFC. In the special case of impartial games, however, the Descending Game Condition is exactly the Axiom of Foundation; see Section 7.
2.3. Adding and comparing games. [ONAG, § § 7, 1] , [WW, § 2] Let us now introduce one of the most important concepts of the theory: the sum of two games. Intuitively, we put two games next to each other and allow each player to move in one of the two according to his choice, leaving the other game unchanged; the next player can then decide independently whether to move in the same game as her predecessor. The negative of a game is the same game in which the allowed moves for both players are interchanged (in games like chess, they simply switch colors). The formal definitions are given below. Note that at this point it is really necessary to require the DGC in its general form (rather than only for alternating moves) in order to guarantee that the sum of two games is again a game (which ends after a finite number of moves).
Definition 2.7 (Sum and Negative of Games
. . be two games. Then we define
These are again recursive definitions. The definition of G + H requires knowing several sums of the form G L + H etc. which must be defined first. However, all these additions are easier than G + H: recursive definitions work by induction without base, similarly as Conway Induction (this time, for binary relations): the sum G+H is well-defined as soon as all options G L +H etc. are well-defined 4 . To see how things get off the ground, note that the set of left options of G + H is
where G L and H L run through the left options of G and H. If G and/or H have no left options, then the corresponding unions are empty, and there might be no left options of G + H at all, or they might be all of the form G L + H (or G + H L ). Therefore, G + H and −G are games.
As an example, −1 ≡ { | 0} is really the negative of 1 ≡ {0 | }, justifying our notation. Also, * + * ≡ { * | * }, and the latter is easily seen to be a zero game (whoever begins, loses), so * + * = 0. The following properties justify the name 'addition' for the operation just defined.
4 More formally, one could consider G + H a formal pair of games and then prove by Conway Induction that every such formal pair is in fact a game: if all formal pairs
R + H and G + H R are games, then clearly so is G + H. Similar remarks apply to the definition of multiplication and elsewhere. 
Commutativity uses induction too (in the second equality):
Associativity works similarly (we write only left options):
Moreover, omitting dots from now on,
where again induction was used in the third equality. Finally,
where −G R means −(G R ), etc. The third line uses induction again. P Conway calls inductive proofs like the preceding ones 'one-line proofs' (even if they do not fit on a single line): resolve the definitions, apply induction, and plug in the definitions again.
Note that
From now on, we will omit the dots in games like this (as already done in the previous proof). As examples, consider the games 2 :
Definition 2.9. We will write
It is obvious from the definition and the preceding result that these binary relations extend the unary relations G = 0 etc. defined earlier.
Theorem 2.10. Every game
R ≤ 0; but we just showed that the right options are
The equality G − G = 0 means that in the sum of any game with its negative, the second player has a winning strategy: indeed, if the first player makes any move in G, then the second player has the same move in −G available and can copy the first move; the same holds if the first player moves in −G because −(−G) ≡ G. Therefore, the second player can never run out of moves before the first does, so the Normal Play Convention awards the win to the second player. This is sometimes paraphrased like this: when playing against a Grand Master simultaneously two games of chess, one with white and one with black, then you can force at least one win (if draws are not permitted, as in our theory)! In Misère Play, we would not have the fundamental equality G = G.
The following results show that the ordering of games is compatible with addition.
Lemma 2.11.
Note that G £ 0 and H £ 0 implies nothing about G + H: the sum of two fuzzy games can be in any outcome class. (Find examples!) Proof: We prove both statements simultaneously using Conway Induction (with the binary relation P (G, H): 'for the pair of games G and H, the statement of the Lemma holds'). The following proof can easily be rephrased in the spirit of 'Left has a winning move unless. . . '.
(1) G ≥ 0 and H ≥ 0 mean there are no G R ≤ 0 and no
12. The addition of a zero game never changes the outcome: if 
, which by Theorem 2.12 has the same outcome class as G and H. P Corollary 2.14. Addition respects the order: for any triple of games, G > H is equivalent to G + K > H + K, etc.
Theorem 2.15. The relation ≥ is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive, and equality = is an equivalence relation.
Proof: Reflexivity of ≥ and = is Theorem 2.10, and antisymmetry of ≥ and symmetry of = are defined. Transitivity of ≥ and thus of = follows like this:
Lemma 2.11. By Theorem 2.12, this implies G − K ≥ 0 and G ≥ K. P
Theorem 2.16. The equivalence classes formed by equal games form an additive abelian GROUP in which the zero element is represented by any game G = 0.
Proof: First we have to observe that addition and negation are compatible with respect to the equivalence relation:
For every game G, the game −G represents the inverse equivalence class by Theorem 2.10. Finally, addition is associative and commutative by Theorem 2.8. P It is all well to define equivalence classes of games, but their significance sits in the fact that replacing a game by an equivalent one never changes the outcome, even when this happens for games that are themselves parts of other games.
Theorem 2.17 (Equal Games
). If H = H ′ , then G + H = G + H ′ for all games G. If G = G L 1 , G L 2 , . . . | G R 1 , G R 2 , . . . and H = H L 1 , H L 2 , . . . | H R 1 , H R 2 , . . . are two games such that G L i = H L i and G R i = H R i
for all left and right options, then G = H: replacing any option by an equivalent one (or any set of options by equivalent options) yields an equivalent game.
Proof: The first part is self-proving:
The second part is similar, but easier to write in words: in G − H, Left might move in G to some G L − H or in H to some G − H R , and Right's answer will be either in
The situation is analogous if Right starts. P 2.4. Simplifying games. [WW, § 3] , [ONAG, § 10] Since equality of games is a defined equivalence relation, there are many ways of writing down a game that has a certain value (i.e., lies in a certain equivalence class). Some of these will be simpler than others, and there may even be a simplest or canonical form of a game. In this section, we show how one can simplify games and that simplest forms exist for an interesting class of games. 
(Here, {H L , . . . } and {H R , . . . } can be arbitrary sets of games.)
In the same way, we see that G ′ − G ≤ 0, and it follows that G ′ = G. P This 'Gift Horse Principle' tells us how to offer extra options to a player without changing the value of a game (since no player really wants to move to these options), so we know how to make games more complicated. Now we want to see how we can remove options and thereby make a game simpler. Intuitively, an option that is no better than another option can as well be left out, since a reasonable player will never use it. This is formalized in the following definition and lemma. 
We can therefore add all these options to G ′ , thereby obtaining G, without changing the value. The same argument works for dominated right options. P As simple examples, we have 2 ≡ {1 | } = {0, 1 | }, 3 ≡ {2 | } = {0, 1, 2 | } etc., so we recover von Neumann's definition of natural numbers. Another example would be {0, 1 | 2, 3} = {1 | 2}. Note that it is possible that all options are dominated, but this does not mean that all options can be removed: as an example, consider
There is another way of simplifying a game that does not work by removing options, but by introducing shortcuts. 
Since K is a right option of H, this in turn says that H ¡ G ′ , as was to be shown. By the Gift Horse Principle, we now have is Right deprived of her better move? For the answer, notice that { | 1} = { | 100} = 0: although Right might prefer that her only move was 1 rather than 100, the first player to move will always lose, which is all that counts. Similarly, depriving Right of her better answer G LR ′ would make a difference only if there was a game S such that G + S ≤ 0 but G LR + S £ 0 (our interest is in the case that Left starts: these conditions mean that Left cannot win in G + S, but he can when jumping directly to G LR ); however, the first condition and the hypothesis imply G LR + S ≤ G + S ≤ 0, contradicting the second condition.
Given the simplifications of games described above, the question arises whether there is a simplest form of a game: a form that cannot be further simplified by removing dominated options and bypassing reversible options. The example ω = {0, 1, 2, . . . | } shows that this is not the case in general. But such a simplest form exists if we impose a natural finiteness condition which is satisfied by most real-life games.
Definition 2.24 (Short). A game G is called short if it has only finitely many positions.
Theorem 2.25 (Normal Form). In each equivalence class of short games, there is a unique game that has no dominated or reversible positions.
Proof: Since both ways of simplifying games reduce the number of positions, we eventually reach a game that cannot be simplified further. This proves existence.
To prove uniqueness, we assume that G and H are two equal (short) games both without dominated and reversible positions. We have to show that
In that way, we see that G and H have the same set of (identical) left options, and the same is true for the right options. P 3. The FIELD of Numbers
We already have encountered games like 0, 1, −1, 2 that we have denoted by numbers and that behave like numbers. In particular, they measure which player has got how many free moves left and therefore are easy to compare. We now want to extend this to a class of games that is as large as possible (and whose elements are to be called numbers).
The guiding idea is that numbers should be totally ordered, i.e. no two numbers should ever be fuzzy to each other. Recall that by Thm. 2.10 we always have
In order for numbers to be preserved under playing, we need to require that all options of numbers are numbers. This leads to the following definition. As it turns out, this simple definition leads not only to a totally ordered additive subGROUP of games but even to an algebraically closed FIELD which simultaneously contains the real and ordinal numbers! We will use lowercase letters x, y, z, . . . to denote numbers. The simplest numbers are 0, 1 and −1. A slightly more interesting number is = 1, justifying the name). There are also 'infinite numbers' like ω = {0, 1, 2, . . . | }.
We use the inductive hypothesis x LL < x L and x L − x ¡ 0 from Theorem 2.10. Therefore, Lemma 2.11 implies 
R , so the options of −x are ordered as required. Conway Induction now shows that −x is a number.
In
. . , we have the inequalities x L + y < x R + y and x + y L < x + y R by Corollary 2.14. By Lemma 3.2, we also have x L + y < x + y < x + y R and x + y L < x + y < x R + y, so x + y is a number as soon as all its options are, and Conway Induction applies. P Theorem 3.4. Numbers are totally ordered: every pair of numbers x and y satisfies exactly one of x < y, x > y, or x = y.
Proof: Suppose there was a number z 0. This would imply the existence of options z L ≥ 0 ≥ z R , which is excluded by definition: numbers are never fuzzy. Now if there were two numbers x y, then x − y would be a number by Theorem 3.3 and x − y 0, but this is impossible, as we have just shown. P 3.2. Short numbers and real numbers.
A short number is simply a number that is a short game, i.e. a game with only finitely many positions. In particular, it then has only finitely many options, and since numbers are totally ordered, we can eliminate dominated options so as to leave at most one left, resp. right option.
By the definition of negation, addition and multiplication (see below in Section 3.3), it is easily seen that the set (!) of (equivalence classes of) short numbers forms a unitary ring. ] is contained in the ring of short numbers. For the converse, see [ONAG, Theorem 12] . The main step in proving the converse is to show that
for integers m and natural numbers n. P Let S denote the ring of short numbers (or dyadic fractions). We can represent every element x of S in the form x = {y ∈ S : y < x | y ∈ S : y > x} , where both sets of options are nonempty. In fact, the set of all numbers satisfying this property is exactly the field R of real numbers: we are taking Dedekind sections in the ring S. (More precisely, this is the most natural model of the real numbers within our Conway numbers: it is the only one where all real numbers have all their options in S. There are other embeddings that are obtained by choosing a transcendence basis of R over Q and then changing the images of this basis by some infinitesimal amounts.) For some more discussion, see [ONAG, Chapter 2] .
3.3. Multiplication of numbers. In order to turn numbers into a FIELD, we need a multiplication.
. . , we define the product
. .
As with addition in (2.1), the left and right options are all terms as in the definition that can be formed with left and right options of x and y. More precisely, the left options are indexed by pairs (x L , y L ) and pairs (x R , y R ), and similarly for the right options. In particular, this means that if x has no left options (say), then x · y will not have left and right options of the first type shown. We will usually omit the dot and write xy for x · y.
While this definition might look complicated, it really is not. It is motivated by x L < x < x R and y L < y < y R , so we want multiplication to satisfy ( One might try the simpler definition xy = x L y, xy L | x R y, xy R for multiplication, motivated by x L < x < x R and y L < y < y R . But the inequalities would be wrong for negative numbers. In fact, this would be just a different notation for addition! Recall the two special numbers 0 ≡ { | } and 1 ≡ {0 | }.
Theorem 3.7. For all numbers x, y, z, we have the identities
and the equalities (x + y)z = xz + yz , (xy)z = x(yz) .
Proof:
The proofs are routine '1-line-proofs'; the last two are a bit lengthy and can be found in [ONAG, Theorem 7] . P The reason why multiplication is defined only for numbers, not for arbitrary games, is that there are games G, G ′ , H with G = G ′ but GH = G ′ H. For example, we have {1 | } = {0, 1 | }, but {1 | } · * = { * | * } = 0, whereas {0, 1 | } · * = {0, * | 0, * } 0. (Note that we have 0 · G = 0 and 1 · G = G for any game G. Furthermore, since games form an abelian GROUP, we always have integral multiples of arbitrary games.)
The following theorem shows that our multiplication behaves as expected. Its proof is the most complicated inductive proof in this paper. It required quite some work to produce a concise version of the argument in the proof, even with Conway's [ONAG, Theorem 8] at hand. The main difficulty is to organize a simultaneous induction for three different statements with different arguments. (1) If x and y are numbers, then so is xy.
(2) If x 1 , x 2 , y are numbers such that x 1 = x 2 , then x 1 y = x 2 y. (3) If x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 are numbers such that x 1 < x 2 and y 1 < y 2 , then x 1 y 2 + x 2 y 1 < x 1 y 1 + x 2 y 2 . In particular, if y > 0, then x 1 < x 2 implies x 1 y < x 2 y.
Proof: We will prove most of the statements simultaneously using Conway Induction. More precisely, let P 1 (x, y), P 2 (x 1 , x 2 , y) and P 3 (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ) stand for the statements above. For technical reasons, we also introduce the statement P 4 (x, y 1 , y 2 ): (4) If x, y 1 , y 2 are numbers with y 1 < y 2 , then P 3 (x L , x, y 1 , y 2 ) and
We begin by proving P 1 , P 2 and P 4 simultaneously. For this part, we assume that all occurring numbers are positions in a fixed number z (we can take z = {x, x 1 , x 2 , y, y 1 , y 2 | }). Then for a position z ′ in z, we define n(z ′ ) to be the distance between z ′ and the root z in the rooted tree representing the game z: that is the number of moves needed to reach z ′ from the starting position z (a non-negative integer). Formally, we set n(z) = 0 and, if z ′ is a position in z, n(z ′ L ) = n(z ′ ) + 1, n(z ′ R ) = n(z ′ ) + 1. For each statement P 1 , P 2 , P 4 , we measure its 'depth' by a pair of natural numbers (r, s) (where s = ∞ is allowed) as follows.
• The depth of P 1 (x, y) is (n(x) + n(y), ∞).
• The depth of P 2 (x 1 , x 2 , y) is (min{n(x 1 ), n(x 2 )} + n(y), max{n(x 1 ), n(x 2 )}).
• The depth of P 4 (x, y 1 , y 2 ) is (n(x) + min{n(y 1 ), n(y 2 )}, max{n(y 1 ), n(y 2 )}).
The inductive argument consists in showing that each statement follows from statements that have greater depths (in the lexicographic ordering) and only involve positions of the games occurring in the statement under consideration. If the statement was false, it would follow that there was an infinite chain of positions z ′ in z of unbounded depth n(z ′ ), each a position of its predecessor; this would contradict the Descending Game Condition.
Properties of addition will be used without explicit mention.
(1) We begin with P 1 (x, y). We may assume that all terms
; therefore all options of xy are numbers. It remains to show that the left options are smaller than the right options. There are four inequalities to show; we treat one of them in detail (the others being analogous). We show that
There are three cases. First suppose that
, which is in turn a special case of
(2) For P 2 (x 1 , x 2 , y), note that
for all relevant options. So we have to show a number of statements of the type (x 1 y) L < x 2 y or x 2 y < (x 1 y) R . We carry this out for the left option (
1 y L ; the other possible cases are done in the same way. Statement
L < x 2 y. (3) We now consider P 4 (x, y 1 , y 2 ). Since y 1 < y 2 , there is some y R 1 such that y 1 < y R 1 ≤ y 2 , or there is some y L 2 such that y 1 ≤ y L 2 < y 2 . We consider the first case; the second one is analogous. First note that from P 1 (x, y 1 ), we get (xy 1 ) L < xy 1 < (xy 1 ) R for all left and right options of xy 1 . We therefore obtain the inequalities
and x R y 1 + xy
Adding the left resp. right inequalities in (3.1) and (3.1) and canceling like terms proves the claim. This shows that every statement P 1 (x, y), P 2 (x 1 , x 2 , y), and P 4 (x, y 1 , y 2 ) follows from similar statements which use the same arguments or some of their options, and it is easily verified that all used statements have greater depths. This proves P 1 , P 2 and P 4 .
(4) It remains to show P 3 (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ). This is done by Conway Induction in the normal way, using the statements we have already shown. Since x 1 < x 2 , there is some x R 1 ≤ x 2 or some x L 2 ≥ x 1 . Assume the first possibility (the other one is treated in the same way). If x R 1 = x 2 , then we apply P 2 to get x R 1 y 1 = x 2 y 1 and x R 1 y 2 = x 2 y 2 . Using P 4 (x 1 , y 1 , y 2 ), we also have x 1 y 2 + x R 1 y 1 < x 1 y 1 + x R 1 y 2 ; together, these imply the desired conclusion. Finally, if x R 1 < x 2 , then by induction (P 3 (x R 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 )), we get x R 1 y 2 + x 2 y 1 < x R 1 y 1 + x 2 y 2 and, using P 4 (x 1 , y 1 , y 2 ) again, also x 1 y 2 + x R 1 y 1 < x 1 y 1 + x R 1 y 2 . Adding them together and canceling like terms proves our claim. has infinitely many positions which must all be 'generated' somehow from the positions of 3. It suffices to find a multiplicative inverse for every x > 0. It is convenient to rewrite positive numbers as follows.
Lemma 3.9. For every number x > 0, there is a number y without negative options such that y = x.
Proof: To achieve this, we simply add the left Gift Horse 0 and then delete all negative left options, which are now dominated by 0. P Theorem 3.10. For a number x > 0 without negative options, define Note that this definition is recursive as always: in order to find y = 1/x, we need to know 1/x L and 1/x R first. However, this time we also need to know left and right options of y. We view this really as an algorithmic definition: initially, make 0 a left option of y. Then, for every left option y L generated so far, produce new left and right options of y with all x L and all x R ; similarly, for every right option y R already generated, do the same. This step is then iterated (countably) infinitely often. More precisely, we define a sequence of pairs of sets of numbers
If x is a real number (which always can be written with at most countably many options), we generate in every step new sets of left and right options, the suprema and infima of which converge to 1/x. In this case, we have a convergent (infinite) algorithm specifying a Cauchy sequence of numbers. General numbers x might need arbitrarily big sets of options, so the option sets of y can become arbitrarily big too. However, the necessary number of iteration steps in the construction of y is still at most countable. Proof: (Compare [ONAG, Theorem 10] .) By induction, all the options of y are numbers (there are of course two inductive processes involved, one with respect to x, and the other with respect to n above). We now prove that we have xy L < 1 < xy R for all left and right options of y. This is done by induction on n. The statement is obvious for n = 0. We give one of the four cases for the inductive step in detail:
which is equivalent to the claim.
In order to prove that y is a number, we must show that the left options are smaller than the right options. It is easy to see that the right options are positive:
. There are then four more cases involving the two different kinds of generated left resp. right options. We look at two of them, the other two are dealt with analogously. So suppose we want to show that (1+(
L . This is equivalent to
The left hand side of this equation can be written in each of the following two ways:
showing that it is always positive. Now suppose we want to show that (1 + (
. This is equivalent to
Again, the left hand side can be written as
showing that it is always positive. Note that we are using the inductive result that the 'earlier' options y R and y L satisfy y R > y L . Finally, to prove that xy = 1, we have to show that (xy)
P Corollary 3.11. The (equivalence classes of ) numbers form a totally ordered FIELD.
In fact, this field is real algebraically closed. This is shown in [ONAG, Chapter 4] .
Ordinal numbers

Ordinal Numbers. [ONAG, § 2]
Definition 4.1 (Ordinal Number). A game G is an ordinal number if it has no right options and all of its left options are ordinal numbers.
We will use small Greek letters like α, β, γ, . . . to denote ordinal numbers. An ordinal number is really a number in our sense, as the following lemma shows. Proof: Note that β < α implies that there is an α L such that β ≤ α L . This follows from α − β = α L − β | . . . and the definition of G £ 0.
(1) Proof by induction. By hypothesis, all α L are numbers. Since there are no α R , the condition α L < α R for all pairs (α L , α R ) is trivially satisfied; hence α is itself a number.
(2) We claim that {β :
The statement follows from this by induction and the fact that the union of a family of sets indexed by a set is again a set.
The RHS is certainly contained in the LHS, since all α L < α. Now let
showing that β is an element of the RHS. Recall that an ordered set or class is called well-ordered if every nonempty subset or subclass has a smallest element. This is equivalent to the requirement that there be no infinite descending chain of elements x 0 > x 1 > x 2 > . . . .
Proposition 4.3. The class of ordinal numbers is well-ordered.
Proof: Let C be some nonempty class of ordinal numbers. Then there is some α ∈ C. Replace C by the set S = {β ∈ C : β ≤ α}; then it suffices to show that the set {β : β ≤ α} is well-ordered. But every descending chain in this set is a chain of options of {α | } and therefore must be finite by the DGC. P The principle of Conway Induction applied to ordinal numbers results in the Theorem of Ordinal Induction (sometimes called 'transfinite induction').
Theorem 4.4 (Ordinal Induction). Let P be a property which ordinal numbers might have. If 'β satisfies P for all β < α' implies 'α satisfies P ', then all ordinal numbers satisfy P .
Proof: Apply Conway Induction to the property 'if G is an ordinal number, then G satisfies P ', and recall that α = {β < α | }. P On the other hand, one could use the concept of birthdays (see below) to prove the principle of Conway Induction from the Theorem of Ordinal Induction.
Of course, we then also have a principle of Ordinal Recursion. For example, we can recursively define the following numbers. These numbers are all positive and approach zero, in a similar way as the ordinal numbers approach infinity -for every positive number z > 0, there is some ordinal number α such that 2 −α < z. As an example, we have 2 −ω = ω −1 . The notation is justified, since one shows easily that 2 · 2 −(α+1) = 2 −α . Finally, there is another important property of the ordinal numbers, which is sort of dual to the well-ordering property.
Proposition 4.6. Every set of ordinal numbers has a least upper bound within the ordinal numbers.
Proof: Let S be such a set. Then α = {S | } is an ordinal number 5 and an upper bound for S. Hence the class of ordinal upper bounds is nonempty, therefore (because of well-ordering) there is a least upper bound. P 4.2. Birthdays. The concept of birthday of a game is a way of making the history of creation of numbers and games precise. It assigns to every game an ordinal number which can be understood as the 'number of steps' that are necessary to create this game 'out of nothing' (i.e., starting with the empty set). By definition, the birthday is an ordinal number. It has the following simple properties.
Proof: Immediate from the definition. P Note that two games that are equal can have different birthdays. For example, {−1 | 1} = 0, but the first has birthday 2, whereas b(0) = 0. But there is a welldefined minimal birthday among the games in an equivalence class.
Proposition 4.9. A game G is short if and only if it has birthday
Proof: If G is short, then by induction all its finitely many options have finite birthdays. Let b be the maximum of these. Then b(G) = {b | } = b + 1 < ω. The reverse implication follows from the fact that there are only finitely many games with any given finite birthday (this is easily seen by ordinary induction). P The birthday is sometimes useful if one needs a bound on a game.
Proof: It suffices to prove the upper bound; the lower bound follows by replacing G with −G, since both have the same birthday.
Let α = b(G). G ≤ α means that for all G L , we have G L ¡ α, and for all α R , we have G ¡ α R . But there are no α R , so we can forget about the second condition. Now by induction,
giving the first part. P
Games and Numbers
In some sense, numbers are the simplest games -since they are totally ordered, we know exactly what happens (i.e., who wins) when we add games that are numbers. It is much more difficult to deal with general games. In order to make life easier, we try to get as much mileage as we can out of comparing games with numbers. References for this chapter are [ONAG, § § 8, 9] , [WW, § § 2, 6].
When is a game already a number?
If we want to compare games with numbers, the first question we have to answer is whether a given game is already (equal to) a number. The following result gives a general recipe for deciding that two games are equal; it can be used to provide a criterion for when a game is a number.
Proposition 5.1 (General Simplicity Theorem). Let G and H be games such that
Proof: By the first assumption, all G L are left gift horses for H, and all G R are right gift horses for H. So H = K, where K is the game whose set of left (resp. right) options is the union of the left (resp. right) options of G and of H. Then by the second assumption, all the options in K that came from H are dominated by options that came from G, so we can eliminate all the options coming from H and get H = K = G. P Note that if H is a number, then the second condition means that the first condition does not hold with H replaced by an option of H. This gives the usual statement of the Simplicity Theorem for comparing games with numbers (the last claim in the following corollary). Proof: (See also [ONAG, Thm. 11] .) The second statement is a special case of Prop. 5.1. If there is an option
Corollary 5.2. Suppose G is a game and x is a number such that ∀G
and use induction. P The notion of 'simple' games is defined in terms of birthdays: the earlier a game is created (i.e. the smaller its birthday), the simpler it is. The simplest game is 0 = { | } which is created first, and subsequently more and more complicated games with later birthdays are created out of simpler (older) ones. The name 'Simplicity Theorem' for the last statement in the corollary above comes from the fact that in this case, x is the 'simplest' number satisfying the assumption (because none of its options do). If G is a number, the statement can then be interpreted as saying that G equals the simplest number that fits between G's left and right options.
For example, a game that has no right options must equal a number, since
In fact, this number is a position of b(G), hence G is even an ordinal number.
Note that a game G such that for all pairs (G L , G R ) we have G L < G R is not necessarily a number. A simple counterexample is given by G = {0 | ↑}, where ↑ = {0 | * }, which is a positive game smaller than all positive (Conway) numbers (an all small game, see below in Section 6), but we have 0 < ↑.
5.2.
How to play with numbers. It is clear how one has to play in a number: choose an option which is as large (or as small) as possible. It is always a disadvantage to move in a number because one has to move to a position worse than before. In any case, we can easily predict from the sign of the number who will win the game, and in order to achieve this win, it is only necessary to choose options of the correct sign. As far as playing is concerned, numbers are pretty boring! But what is good play in a sum G + x, where x is a number and G is not?
Theorem 5.3 (Weak Number Avoidance Theorem). If G is a game that is not equal to a number and x is a number, then
Proof: The implication '⇐' is trivial. Now assume x ¡ G. This means that either ∃G L ≥ x (and we are done), or ∃x R ≤ G, and we can assume that for all G L , we have x £ G L . Since G is not equal to a number by assumption, Cor. 5.2 implies that there is some
If we apply this to G and −x, it says G + x £ 0 ⇐⇒ G L + x ≥ 0 for some G L . In words, this means that if there is a winning move in the sum G + x, then there is already a winning move in the G component. In short:
In order to win a game, you do not have to move in a number, unless there is nothing else to do. This does not mean, however, that the other options G + x L are redundant (i.e., dominated or reversible). This is only the case in general when G is short. In order to prove this stronger version of the Number Avoidance Theorem, we need some preparations.
Definition 5.4 (Left and Right Stops). Let G be a short game. We define (short) numbers L(G) and R(G), the left and right stops of G, as follows.
If G is (equal to) a number, we set L(G) = R(G) = G. Otherwise,
Since G has only finitely many options, the maxima and minima exist. Note that G must have left and right options; otherwise G would be a number.
One can think of L(G) as the best value Left can achieve as first player in G, at the point when the game becomes a number. Similarly, R(G) is the best value Right can achieve when moving first. (Since numbers are pretty uninteresting games, we can stop playing as soon as the game turns into a number; this number can then conveniently be interpreted as the score of the game.)
Proposition 5.5. Let G be a short game.
(1) If y is a number, then the following implications hold.
(2) If z > 0 is a positive number and G is not equal to a number, then G < G L +z for some G L .
Proof:
, and the statements are trivially true. If G is not a number, we proceed by induction.
But this implies y ¡ G. The other two statements are proved analogously.
(2) Let y = L(G) + z/2. By the first part, we then have y > G and y − z ¡ G.
By Thm. 5.3, there is a
P
The first part of the preceding proposition can be interpreted as saying that the confusion interval of G (the set of numbers G is fuzzy to) extends from R(G) to L(G). (The endpoints may or may not be included; this depends on who has the move when the game reaches its stopping position; compare the Temperature Theory of games in [ONAG, § 9] and [WW, § 6] .)
With these preparations, we can now state and prove the Number Avoidance Theorem in its strong form.
Theorem 5.6 (Strong Number Avoidance Theorem). If G is a short game that is not equal to a number and x is a number, then
Proof: (Compare [ONAG, Thm. 90] .)
By the second part of Prop. 5.5, applied 
x is dominated and can be removed. An analogous argument applies to G + x R . P Let us demonstrate that the assumption on G is really necessary. Consider the game
This game G also provides a counterexample to the second part of Prop. 5.5 for non-short games. It is easily seen that G n for all integers n, hence G < G L + 1 is impossible.
The deeper reason for this failure is that it is not possible to define left and right stops for general games. And this is because there is nothing like a supremum of an arbitrary set of numbers (for example, Z has no least upper bound). This should be contrasted with the situation we have with ordinal numbers, where every set of ordinal numbers has a least upper bound within the ordinal numbers.
6. Infinitesimal games [WW, § 8] If a game is approximately the size of a positive (or negative) number, we know that Left (or Right) will win it. But there are games which are less than all positive numbers and greater than all negative numbers, and we do not get a hint as to who is favored by the game. Such a game is called infinitesimal.
(1) A game G is called infinitesimal if −2 −n < G < 2 −n for all natural numbers n. (2) A game G is called strongly infinitesimal if −z < G < z for all positive numbers z.
An example of an infinitesimal, but not strongly infinitesimal game is given by 2 −ω = {0 | 2 −n : n ∈ N}. The standard example of a positive strongly infinitesimal game is ↑ = {0 | * } (pronounced 'up'). More examples are provided by the following class of games. Proof: If G is a number, then G = 0, and the claim holds trivially. Otherwise, G has left and right options, all of which are strongly infinitesimal by induction. Let z > 0 be a number. Let z R be some right option of z. Then for all and hence for some G R , we have G R < z < z R and so G ¡ z R . On the other hand, we have G L < z for all G L . Together, these two facts imply that G ≤ z. The inequality G ≥ −z is shown in the same way. P Not all strongly infinitesimal games are all small. Examples are provided by 'tinies' and 'minies' like {0 | {0 | −1}} [WW, § 5] .
We will see in a moment that for short games, 'infinitesimal' and 'strongly infinitesimal' are the same. More precisely, the following theorem tells us that a short infinitesimal game is already bounded by some integral multiple of ↑. (This is mentioned in [WW, § 20 : 'The Paradox'], but we do not know of a published proof.) For example, we have * < 2↑, and so also 2↑ + * > 0.
Theorem 6.4. Let G be a short game.
(1) If G ¡ 2 −n for all positive integers n, there is some positive integer m such that G ¡ m↑.
−n for all positive integers n, there is some positive integer m such that G ≤ m↑.
Proof: We can assume that G is not a number, because otherwise the assumption implies in both cases that G ≤ 0. We use induction.
(1) G ¡ 2 −n means by Thm. 5.3 that there is some G R with G R ≤ 2 −n . Since there are only finitely many G R (G is short), there must be one G R that works for infinitely many and hence for all n. By induction, we conclude that G R ≤ m↑ for this G R and some m and therefore G ¡ m↑ for this m.
. Hence G satisfies the assumption of the first part, and we conclude that there is some m 0 such that
P The apparent asymmetry in this proof is due to the lack of something like an 'Up Avoidance Theorem'. This result says that infinitesimal short games can be measured in (short) units of ↑. This is the justification behind the 'atomic weight calculus' described in [WW, § § 7, 8] .
Remark 6.5. It is perhaps tempting to think that a similar statement should be true for strongly infinitesimal general games. If one tries to mimic the above proof, one runs into two difficulties. In the first part, we have used that any finite set of positive short numbers has a positive short lower bound. The corresponding conclusion would still be valid, since any set of positive numbers has a positive lower bound (which is a number). (For z > 0 it is easy to see that z ≥ 2 −b(z) ; the claim then follows from the statement on upper bounds for sets of ordinals.) In the second part, we have used that any finite set of natural numbers (or of multiples m↑) has an upper bound. This does not seem to generalize easily. 7. Impartial Games [WW, § 3] , [ONAG, § 11] 7.1. What is an impartial game? An impartial game is one in which both players have the same possible moves in every position. Formally, this reads as follows.
Definition 7.1 (Impartial Game). An impartial game is a game for which the sets of left and right options are equal, and all options are impartial games themselves.
It follows that every impartial game G satisfies G = −G, hence G + G = 0. Therefore, G = 0 or G 0. There is no need to distinguish the sets of left and right options, so we simply write G = {G ′ , G ′′ , . . . }, where {G ′ , G ′′ , . . . } is the set of options of G (again, this notation is not meant to suggest that the set of options should be countable or non-empty).
The standard examples include the game of Nim: it consists of a finite collection of heaps H 1 , . . . , H n , each of which is an ordinal number (some number of coins, matches, etc.; if this makes you feel more comfortable, think of natural numbers only). A move consists of reducing any single heap by an arbitrary amount (i.e., replacing one of the ordinal numbers by a strictly smaller ordinal number), leaving all other heaps unaffected. A move in the ordinal number 0 is of course impossible, so the game ends when all heaps are reduced to 0. As usual, winner is the one who made the last move. Note that a single heap game is trivial: if the heap is non-zero, then the winning move consists in reducing the heap to zero, leaving no legal move to the opponent. A game with several heaps is the sum (in our usual sense) of its heaps: it is H 1 + H 2 + · · · + H n .
Conway coined the term nimber for a single Nim heap, and he writes * n for a heap of size n (where n is of course an ordinal number). The rules of Nim can then simply be written as * 0 = 0, * n = { * 0, * 1, . . . , * (n − 1)} (if n is finite) or * n = { * k : k < n} (in general). We have * n = * k if and only n = k: the equality * n = * k means 0 = * n − * k = * n + * k (note that * k = − * k since nimbers are impartial games), and in * n + * k with n = k the first player wins by reducing the larger heap so as to leave two heaps of equal size to the opponent). The nimbers inherit a total ordering from the ordinal numbers so that every set of nimbers is well-ordered (Proposition 4.3). But note that this is not the same as the ordering of general games restricted to impartial games: a Nim heap * n of size n > 0 has * n 0, not * n > 0! A second note on set theory. Since there is no need to distinguish the left and right options of impartial games, and all these options are impartial games themselves, Definition 2.1 of Games simplifies to the following: Definition 7.2 (Impartial Game).
(1) Let G be a set of impartial games. Then G is an impartial game.
(2) (Descending Game Condition for Impartial Games). There is no infinite sequence of games G i with G i+1 ∈ G i for all i ∈ N.
Therefore, impartial games are just sets in the sense of Zermelo and Fraenkel; the Descending Game Condition exactly reduces to the Axiom of Foundation. 6 The observation that every set can be viewed as an impartial game leads to amusing questions of the type "what is the Nim heap equivalent to Z, Q, R, C, . . . ?" The answer of course depends on the exact way of representing these sets within set theory.
Classification of impartial games.
There is a well-known classification of impartial games, due to Sprague and Grundy, which says that every impartial game is equal to a well-defined nimber * n, hence equal to a Nim game with a single heap, which has trivial winning strategy. Unfortunately, this does not make every impartial game easy to analyze: in practice, it might be hard to tell exactly which nimber an impartial game is equal to; as an example, we mention the game of Sylver Coinage 7 [WW, § 18] . The theory of impartial games is based on the following definition.
Definition 7.3 (The mex: minimal ex cluded nimber). Let G be a set of nimbers. Then mex(G) is the least nimber not contained in G.
Note that every set of nimbers has an upper bound by Proposition 4.6, and the well-ordering of nimbers implies that every set of nimbers has a well-defined minimal excluded nimber, so the mex is well-defined.
The first and fundamental step of the classification is the following observation.
Proposition 7.4 (Bogus Nim). Let G be any set of nimbers. Then G = mex(G).
Some remarks might be in order here. First, G is of course an impartial game itself, describing its set of options which are all nimbers. Now mex(G) is a particular nimber, and the result asserts that the game G is equal as a game to the nimber mex(G). Proof: All we need to show is that G − mex(G) = G + mex(G) = 0. The main trick is to write this right: mex(G) = * n = { * k : k < n} for an ordinal number n, while G = * n ∪ G ′ where G ′ is the set of options of G exceeding * n (note that by assumption * n is not an option of G). The first player has three kinds of possible moves: move in mex(G) = * n to some * k < * n, move in G to an option * k < * n, or move in G to an option * k > * n. The first leads to G + * k and is countered by the move in G to * k + * k = 0; the second kind leads to * k + * n and is countered by the move in * n to * k + * k = 0; finally, the third leads to * k + * n (this time, with k > n) and is countered by a move in * k to * n + * n = 0. In all three cases, the second player moves to 0 and wins. P
The name 'Bogus Nim' refers to the following interpretation of this game: the game G really is a Nim heap * n (offering moves to all * k with k < n), but in addition it is allowed to increase the size of the heap. This increasing is immediately reversed by the second player, bringing the heap back to * n (in which no further increase is possible), so all increasing moves are reversible moves.
A rather obvious corollary is the following: G = * 0 if and only if no legal move in G leads to * 0 (if * 0 is no option of G, then clearly mex(G) = * 0): if G has the option * 0, then this is a winning move for the first player, hence G 0; otherwise, all options of G (if any) lead to nimbers * n = * 0 from which the second player wins.
Theorem 7.5 (The Classification of Impartial Games).
Every impartial game is equal to a unique nimber.
Proof: We use Conway induction: write G = {G ′ , G ′′ , . . . }, listing all options of G. By the inductive hypothesis, every option of G is equal to a nimber, hence (using Theorem 2.17) G = { * k : there is an option of G which equals * k} .
Therefore, all options of G are equal to nimbers, hence by Proposition 7.4 G is equal to the mex of all its options, which is a nimber. Uniqueness is clear. P
We should mention that for the game Nim, there is a well-known explicit strategy, at least for heaps of finite size: in the game G = * n 1 + * n 2 + · · · + * n s , write each heap size n i in binary form and form the exclusive or (XOR) of them. Then G = 0 if and only if the XOR is zero in every bit: in the latter case, it is easy to see that every option of G is non-zero, while if the XOR is non-zero, then every heap which contributes a 1 to the most significant bit of the XOR can be reduced in size so as to turn the game into a zero game.
Nim is often played in Misère play, and the binary strategy as just described works in this form almost without difference, except very near the end when there are at most two heaps of size exceeding one. It is sometimes wrongly concluded that there was a general theory of impartial games in Misère play similarly as Theorem 7.5. However, this is false: the essential difference is the use of Theorem 2.17 which allows us to replace an option by an equivalent one, and this is based on the usual winning convention. There is no analog in Misère play to the Sprague-Grundy-Theory: for any two impartial games G and H without reversible options which are different in form (i.e., G ≡ H), there is another impartial game K such that the winners of G + K and H + K are different; see [ONAG, Chapter 12] .
